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Abstract 
Wholesale suppliers at fuel terminals blend gasoline with ethanol to create finished gasoline. Under the 
US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), this blending activity produces a renewable fuel credit, known as a 
RIN, which blenders can sell to oil refiners who need it for RFS compliance. We estimate whether these 
suppliers, known as rack sellers, pass through the value of RINS. Based on a population-weighted 
regression with 20 large cities, we estimate a 63% RIN pass through for branded fuel (95% confidence 
interval [0.23, 1.03]) and a 92% pass through for unbranded fuel (95% CI [0.70, 1.14]). The confidence 
intervals on the pooled national regressions are wide and include full pass-through. When we estimate 
pass-through in regions, we find that suppliers pass through the RIN value in the Midwest – the so-called 
ethanol belt – and in the Gulf states. The estimates for the Midwest are 0.86 (branded, 95% CI [0.63, 
1.09]) and 0.99 (unbranded, 95% CI [0.83, 1.16]). The estimates for the Gulf region are 0.88 (branded, 
95% CI [0.74, 1.02]) and 0.89 (branded, 95% CI [0.76, 1.02]). In contrast, we find incomplete pass-
through in Eastern cities, with estimates of 0.38 (branded, 95% CI [0.13, 0.63]) and 0.50 (unbranded, 
95% CI [0.14, 0.85]); for the East, these confidence intervals do not include one. Price spreads in the 
West are too volatile to estimate RIN pass through precisely in that region. We also find that pass-
through of RIN values to E10 prices is complete at terminals that offer multiple blends, but is incomplete 
(especially for branded fuels) at terminals that offer neither pure ethanol nor higher blends. The 
incomplete pass-through we find is a sign of too little competition at some terminals and in some 
regions, and that incomplete pass-through reduces the efficiency of the RIN program.   
                                                          
1 Pouliot (pouliot@iastate.edu) Department of Economics, Iowa State University; Smith (adsmith@ucdavis.edu) 
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Corporation for providing the OPIS data we use in this study. Valero provided no funds to the authors. None of the 
authors received any payment from any other source for producing this work. 
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1. Introduction 
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) mandates biofuel blending levels in motor fuels in the United States. 
The Environment Protection Agency (EPA) implements the RFS by specifying annual blending fractions 
for different categories of renewable fuels. Owners of oil refineries and importers of gasoline and diesel 
are obligated under the RFS to show compliance with blending requirements. They comply by acquiring 
sufficient Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) during the year and submitting them to EPA. Biofuel 
production generates RINs. RINs remain attached to biofuel until the biofuel is blended with gasoline or 
diesel into motor fuel. Once detached, RINs become a tradeable commodity that obligated parties can 
purchase. The price of RINs bridges the gap between the marginal cost of producing biofuel and the 
liquid value of that biofuel to blenders. Hence, RINs serve two roles: 1) they provide a means of 
complying with the RFS; and 2) they in effect tax petroleum fuels to provide a subsidy to renewable 
fuels.  
Figure 1 illustrates the gasoline supply chain and the RFS compliance mechanism. We focus here 
on the supply chain for conventional (corn) ethanol and gasoline. In the nested structure of the RFS, the 
price of RINs for other biofuels can affect the price of RINs for conventional ethanol but we simplify 
matters here for clarity. Figure 1 shows a retail sector with two gasoline blends: 1) E10, which is regular 
gasoline and contains no more than 10 percent gasoline, and 2) E85, which contains between 51 and 83 
percent ethanol.  
When the supply chain is perfectly competitive, the RIN compliance mechanism minimizes the 
cost of RFS compliance. To see this, suppose EPA increases an already-binding ethanol mandate. This 
increase will widen the gap between the marginal cost of producing ethanol and the fuel value of 
ethanol in blended fuel. Because the price of RINs bridges this gap, RIN prices will increase. The lower 
value of ethanol going into blending fuels lowers the per-gallon cost of producing E85 much more than 
E10 because E85 contains more ethanol. This unequal impact creates an incentive for blenders to 
produce and market greater quantities of E85 which, in turn, facilitates compliance with the increased 
ethanol mandate. The higher RIN price also results in a higher effective tax on gasoline. In a perfectly 
competitive market, the higher effective gasoline tax propagates through the system so that in 
equilibrium part of the tax is paid by refineries, and part is paid by blenders and consumers through 
higher gasoline prices. The tax incidence depends on the relevant elasticities of demand and supply 
(Pouliot and Babcock 2016).  
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Figure 1: Compliance structure with the RFS 
 
In the summer and fall 2016, several parties petitioned EPA to change the point of RFS 
obligation from the refiners to rack sellers.2 Specifically, the proposal was to redefine an obligated party 
as the “entity that holds title to the gasoline or diesel fuel, immediately prior to the sale from the bulk 
transfer/terminal system, (as defined by IRS regulation 40 CFR §48.4081-1) to a wholesaler, retailer or 
ultimate consumer and is required to report any federal tax liability for gasoline or diesel on its Form 
720” (p. 7 in Valero, 2016). Rack sellers include owners of distribution terminals, fuel distributors that 
lease tank space within terminals and use terminal services to blend fuels that they own. They also 
include refiners who continue to own the fuel through the point of blending. 
Petitioners hypothesize that rack sellers partially capture the value of the RIN rather than 
passing it along the supply chain. However, the economically efficient working of the RIN system 
requires that increases in RIN prices are passed along to the consumer in the form of higher pump prices 
for fuels that have a low renewable content and lower prices for fuels with a high renewable content. If 
                                                          
2 A “rack” is where fuel delivery trucks are filled up in fuel terminals. 
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the price of the RINs does not get passed through to pump prices, then it does not play its role to 
incentivize consumption of ethanol in motor fuel. A first step to determining whether the RIN 
mechanism is working properly is to estimate whether RIN prices are fully passed through along the 
supply chain, as they would be under perfect competition.  
Previous studies provide evidence that the RIN system works properly at certain stages of the 
motor fuel supply chain. Knittel, Meiselman and Stock (2016a,b) find evidence of full RIN pass-through in 
bulk markets, indicating that the RIN system at that stage of the supply chain works as designed. 
Burkhardt (2016) estimates that in 2013 and 2014 refineries more than fully passed their cost of RINs 
down to the wholesale market, however his findings are statistically not different than complete pass-
through. Lade and Bushnell (2016) and Li and Stock (2017) study RIN pass-through at retail for high-
ethanol gasoline blends in fuel stations in Minnesota (Li and Stock) and in Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois 
(Lade and Bushnell). Both studies find complete pass-through in urban areas where there is competition 
for high-ethanol gasoline blends. However, in areas where there is less competition at retail for high-
ethanol gasoline blends, Lade and Bushnell (2016) and Li and Stock (2017) find an imperfect RIN pass-
through. Because most consumers live in urban areas, where there is a high degree of pass-through, 
their results show that, for the three Midwestern states they study, that the RIN market works as 
designed. Li and Stock (2017) also examine pass-through from bulk wholesale prices to rack prices, 
however their data set includes only 12 racks, only has monthly data, and only examines pass-through to 
higher blends, not to E10. 
This paper fills this gap by examining daily data on rack prices and upstream bulk wholesale fuel 
prices to estimate the pass-through of RIN prices to rack prices. The data set consists of a total of 
6,753,219 observations on daily rack prices in 57 cities. We find incomplete pass-through at the rack for 
E10, which is informative about the current RIN system. In particular, these findings indicate that, at 
many terminals, fuel suppliers are exercising market power and retaining some of the RIN premium. As a 
result, the RIN value is not being fully passed through to consumers. These findings do indicate that the 
RIN system does not function in the most efficient manner.  
These findings indicate that there is market power at some racks, in the sense of incomplete 
pass-through. While these findings are relevant to the question of moving the Point of Obligation, by 
themselves they are insufficient to conclude that shifting the Point of Obligation would improve pass-
through and economic efficiency. 
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We begin by providing background information about the gasoline and ethanol markets. We 
then describe our data and show empirical evidence about the pass-through of RIN prices at the rack. 
  
2. Ethanol market background 
The gasoline distribution system was set up in the 20th century to minimize the cost of bringing gasoline 
from refiners to consumers. It is based on an extensive pipeline system that transports gasoline from 
refineries to terminals in population centers. Trucks deliver gasoline from terminals to retail outlets. The 
least-cost way of adding ethanol to motor fuel was to add on new infrastructure to the existing gasoline 
distribution system. This new infrastructure needed to account for specific properties of ethanol such as 
its corrosiveness and its solubility with water, both of which prevent transportation of ethanol through 
existing pipelines. Instead, ethanol is transported from plants to terminals either by rail or by truck. New 
ethanol tanks and rack outlets were constructed at many terminals to receive the ethanol and facilitate 
blending with gasoline. Currently about 98% of non-diesel motor fuel contains 10% ethanol, which 
demonstrates the extent to which required blending infrastructure has been installed.  
 
2.1. Major Fuel Markets 
Bulk markets are situated in areas of the country where fuel companies trade large quantities of motor 
fuel and where market prices are determined. There are six recognized bulk markets: 1) the Gulf (Texas), 
2) New York Harbor, 3) Chicago, 4) Group 3 (Great Plains states), 5) West Coast, and 6) Pacific 
Northwest. Gasoline prices at other locations are typically quoted in terms of a basis relative to bulk 
market prices. Prices for ethanol are set in the same manner. Any bulk market can be used as the 
reference price and which bulk market to use is agreed upon by sellers and buyers of fuel. It is most 
common to use the bulk market that is closest to the location where the transaction takes place. 
 
2.2. Distribution Terminals 
From the bulk markets, gasoline flows to distribution terminals by pipeline, water, rail or trucks. Ethanol 
plants often ship directly to distribution terminals although in some cases the ethanol is delivered to 
major terminals and then re-distributed to regional terminals. Each terminal has a rack, at which one or 
more suppliers, also known as rack sellers, post prices for fuel. Rack sellers acquire bulk gasoline and 
ethanol, blend it, and then sell it to retailers. Fuel retailers may also buy bulk fuel above the rack and use 
a terminal’s facilities to blend it into a finished product. Such firms do not post rack prices because they 
do not sell fuel at the rack.   
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We refer to terminals that lease capacity to any rack seller or retailer as open terminals. 
However, some distribution terminals may not provide open access to their facilities, and we refer to 
these as closed terminals. These terminals are typically owned by major oil companies, and can include 
terminals owned by a refiner at a refinery gate. At an open terminal, a rack seller or retail chain may 
lease space in ethanol and gasoline tanks so that it can buy fuel in bulk. Having their own supply of bulk 
fuel gives retail chains an option to use their own ethanol if the prices being offered at the rack by 
sellers are too high. The ability to arbitrage price differences suggests that ethanol and gasoline prices at 
open terminals should be more competitive than prices at terminals that do not.3  
The cost of handling ethanol at these terminals typically ranges from 3.5 to 4 cents per gallon. 
This cost is significantly higher than the 0.8 to 1 cent per gallon for petroleum gasoline blendstock. In 
some pipeline systems, the higher cost reflects the fact that ethanol replaces petroleum gasoline at 
these terminals, and the terminal owner typically charges 3 cents for gasoline delivered via its pipeline. 
In other systems, the higher cost reflects recovery of the cost of installing ethanol infrastructure at the 
terminal. Overall, a 3 cent higher cost for handling ethanol seems to be an accepted practice at 
distribution terminals.  
Rack prices refer to fuel prices “over the rack” delivered into a truck. Each company posts their 
offer prices available at that price. At an open terminal, a fuel buyer can choose the seller that offers the 
best combination of price arbitrage between all the fuels available. A buyer can choose to purchase E10, 
in which case the terminal is the blender. In some mid-continent markets, a buyer can choose to 
purchase E0 and E100 and splash blend these fuels to make E10. In that case, the buyer becomes the 
fuel blender, although splash blending to make E10 is rare.  
 
2.3. Ethanol shipments 
Every ethanol plant has options about where to can sell their ethanol. Plants typically hire brokers firms 
to market their ethanol for them. Ethanol shipped long distances travels by train, sometimes in unit 
trains of 100 cars. Truck transportation also occurs for shorter-hauls.  We expect the market for ethanol 
to be competitive throughout the country because there are many ethanol plants and many ethanol 
buyers throughout the United States. Higher ethanol prices outside the Midwest should be expected 
because of the higher transportation costs.  
                                                          
3 This statement assumes that the rack sellers and retail chains would be able to access pipeline space to get bulk 
gasoline to the terminal.   
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3. Definition and interpretation of RIN Pass-through 
Our focus is on estimating the pass-through of the RIN at the rack. To understand what we mean by the 
RIN pass-through, consider the rack price for a finished gasoline blend. The blender purchases ethanol at 
a price pe, which includes the value of the RIN, and purchases gasoline at a price pg. The blend rate of 
ethanol into the final fuel is δ (e.g. 10 percent). We define the spread as the difference between the 
price at which the blended fuel is sold, pf, and the cost of acquiring the bulk fuel, i.e., 
  1f e gspread p p p     . (1) 
We define the wet fuel cost as  
     1e gwc p p    
By blending ethanol into a gallon of fuel, the blender generates δ RIN, which it can sell at price ρ. The 
per-gallon blender profit is therefore 
       f f fprofit spread R c p R wc c  , (2) 
where R=δρ denotes RIN revenue and cf denotes the cost of terminaling and blending the fuel.  
 Consider an increase in the RIN price. Competitive blenders would respond to the resulting 
increase in revenue by reducing their rack price and thereby reducing the spread. In a perfectly 
competitive market, these price reductions would continue until the spread had decreased by enough to 
offset the RIN price increase and return profits to zero. This is an example of perfect pass-through. If the 
market is less than perfectly competitive, then blenders may be able to retain some of the RIN revenue 
without passing it through to consumers. For a firm that passes through a proportion β of the RIN 
revenue, we can write using the definition of the spread 
 fspread c R  , (3) 
For example, suppose β=0.6 and RIN revenue increases from 0 to $0.10.  The firm reduces its spread by 
6 cents and retains the remaining 4 cent as profit. Values of β less than one indicate imperfect, or 
partial, pass-through. 
In empirical studies, the usual interpretation of an imperfect pass-through is that it is a signal of 
market power. In the case of the RIN system, imperfect competition at a stage of the supply chain 
means that the firms with market power can shift the incidence of the policy away from them and 
possibly profit from the RIN system.  A regression that shows an imperfect pass-through, however, does 
not tell us whether a blender exercises market power in selling the blended fuel, in purchasing gasoline 
blendstock or ethanol or in selling RINs. 
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 A supplier at a terminal is not likely to be able to exercise market power in the purchase of 
gasoline. Several refineries typically supply a terminal (Borenstein and Shepard, 2002). Gasoline can be 
shipped over long distance at a relatively low cost. Although transient shifts in storage capacity and 
pipeline space constraints can in effect create local markets for bulk petroleum products, over the 
medium and longer run the ability of refiners to sell refined product at multiple terminals provides for 
competition among terminals. Similarly, ethanol is transported by train and trucks, produced in more 
than 100 facilities and is shipped throughout the United States, providing for competition among 
terminals for ethanol. 
The potential for a single supplier to exercise market power in the RIN market is limited. The RIN 
market is nationwide and there are numerous blenders selling RINs and numerous refineries demanding 
RINs. A supplier with market power would use it to raise the price of RINs. For a single supplier in a 
single market this is unlikely because it cannot influence the number of RINs nationwide. A vertically 
integrated firm with control over many terminals would have market power in the RIN market if it were 
large enough to influence to total quantity of ethanol supplied. 
Where a supplier is most likely to be able to exercise market power is when it sells gasoline 
blends to distributors. Indeed, there is evidence that some terminals exercise market power in the fuel 
they sell (e.g. Borenstein and Shepard, 2002; Hastings and Gilbert, 2005). As discussed above, local 
market power can manifest itself only when the terminal remains closed to limit competition at its 
facilities. Another manifestation of market power is a markup that covers more than its cost. This 
markup adjusts to variations in fuel costs and the price of RIN. Thus, although the RIN is valued at 
market price, there can be an imperfect pass-through of the RIN because a blender has market power 
and is able to retain part of the RIN value. 
 
4. Data description 
We use data for prices at the rack to estimate the pass-through of RIN price into the price of gasoline 
blends. We focus on gasoline blends and because virtually all ethanol blended with gasoline is from corn 
ethanol, we only consider the pass-through of the price of D6 RINs.  
 
4.1. Fuel price data 
We use OPIS data on daily rack prices at distribution terminals for 57 cities. We selected cities for the 
dataset with three objectives. First, to cover the most important gasoline markets, we desired a broad 
geographic distribution of major cities. Second, to study markets that have high-ethanol-blend fuels, we 
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included populous cities with multiple parties actively posting prices for such fuels. Third, to obtain 
comprehensive coverage in a particular region, we included all terminals in the states of Iowa, Illinois, 
and Minnesota as well as two border cities in neighboring states, Sioux Falls, SD and Omaha, NE. Thus, 
the cities in our dataset enter under three scopes: 
Scope 1: 10 large cities 
Scope 2: E85 cities 
Scope 3: 3 states 
Figure 1 shows the location of the cities in each scope, and Appendix Table A1 lists the cities. The data 
cover the period between January 1, 2012 and May 31, 2016. The dataset includes the posted price of 
each supplier of each product at each terminal in each city each day. Later, in presenting some results, 
we sort the cities by geographical area.  Appendix Table A2 lists the cities by area. 
 For the main analysis, we select the main E10 product offered in each city. The EPA requires 
reformulated gasoline (RFG) in cities with high smog levels. In such areas, the relevant E10 product is 
“RFG Ethanol 10%”. In most other cities, the relevant E10 product is denoted “Conv. Ethanol 10%” or 
“CBOB Ethanol 10%”. Exceptions are Phoenix, AZ and the California cities, which have distinct RFG 
products due to state and local regulations, and Atlanta, GA, which required low-sulfur gasoline until 
October 2015. Appendix Table A1 lists the E10 products by city. 
 Not all terminals offer the same products all the time. Figure 2 shows offering of high-blend 
ethanol for all terminals in Scopes 1 and 2 as well as Wood River, IL (St Louis) and Omaha, NE. Almost all 
terminals in the Midwest tend to offer high-ethanol blends on a regular basis (see Appendix Table A2 for 
a list of these cities). In other parts of the country, not all terminals offered high-blend ethanol and in 
some locations the offer is sporadic. Terminals in California almost never offered high-ethanol blends. 
OPIS also supplied bulk prices for gasoline blendstock and ethanol. Where appropriate, we use 
the OPIS-computed spot replacement index (SRI) as the bulk price of gasoline. OPIS computes this index 
by taking the spot price in the relevant bulk fuel market and adding the cost of transporting the fuel to 
the relevant city by pipeline and other costs such line loss due to evaporation in the line and terminaling 
and storage fees. For markets without a relevant SRI price in the dataset, we use the spot price at the 
nearest spot market. For bulk ethanol prices, we use the spot price at the relevant spot market. We 
assign ethanol spot markets to cities based on geography and discussions with industry participants. 
Appendix Table A1 lists the bulk prices we use for each city. 
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Figure 1: Location of distribution terminals 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Terminals offering high-blend ethanol 
Note: Green pins identify cities where more than 5 suppliers offered high-blend ethanol for at least 500 days, blue pins identify 
terminals where 3-5 suppliers offered high-blend ethanol for at least 500 days, orange pins identify terminals where 1-2 
suppliers offered high-blend ethanol for at least 500 days, and red pins identify cities where no supplier offered high-blend 
ethanol for at least 500 days. 
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4.2. RIN prices 
OPIS also provided us with the price of D6 RINs, which we plot in Figure 3. Before 2013, the price of RINs 
was close to zero because the RFS was not a binding constraint on marginal biofuel volumes. The price 
of RINs sharply increased sharply at the beginning of 2013 and spiked in July 2013. The increase in the 
RIN price was caused by an increase in the required biofuel volumes beyond that which could be met by 
E10. The price of RINs declined after the release of the EPA’S 2013 Final Rule in August 2013, in which 
the agency indicated a likely reduction in the required volumes in future years due to inadequate 
infrastructure to supply E85 to the market. Lade, Lin and Smith (2016) document that EPA 
announcements about future expected stringency of the RFS drive RIN prices during this period. After 
the August 2013 decline two further events caused RIN price drops, an October 2013 leak of the 
Proposed Rule for 2014 and the November 2013 official release of the 2014 Proposed Rule.  
In the ensuing year, there was a period of uncertainty during which the EPA did not release a 
rule.  Three additional EPA announcements caused significant RIN price changes in the latter part of the 
sample. In November 2014, it delayed release of the 2014 volumes, which the market interpreted as a 
sign that the EPA was likely to push volumes beyond the blend wall causing RIN prices to increase. 
However, in June 2015 it announced a Proposed Rule for 2014, 2015 and 2016 that was less aggressive 
than expected. RIN prices dropped by almost 50%. Finally, in November 2015 it published the Final Rule 
for 2014, 2015 and 2016. This rule surprised markets by requiring more biofuel than expected, which 
caused another jump in RIN prices.  
Figure 3 delineates the three distinct RIN price periods since the beginning of 2012. The 
dramatic increase in 2013 clearly caught fuel markets by surprise. If markets participants had been 
anticipating an increase in RIN prices, they would have been purchasing RINs prior to 2013, which would 
have pushed prices up sooner. Market observers expressed confusion about the cause of the RIN prices 
and whether they were justified economically. Some speculated that financial traders were 
manipulating prices.4 For suppliers at the rack, adapting to and understanding the new reality of high 
RIN prices likely took some time. To allow for the possibility that market participants did not adapt 
immediately to this new market reality, we report pass-through regression results both for the full 
sample and a sample that omits the RIN shock period (1/1/13-8/31/13). 
                                                          
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/business/wall-st-exploits-ethanol-credits-and-prices-spike.html  
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Figure 3: Price of D6 RINs (cents per gallon) 
 
4.3. Margin at the rack 
Equation (1) defines the spread as the difference between the price of the blended fuel and its 
components. Equation (3) expresses the spread as equal to the cost of blending and terminaling minus 
the proportion of RIN revenue that is passed through, i.e., f fspread c R  . In Section 5, we present 
estimates of β using linear regression. In this section, we present some plots and descriptive statistics of 
the spread and RIN revenue.  
 We calculate the spread using one-day lag of the bulk ethanol and gasoline blendstock prices so 
that the spread on day t is measure as 
  1 11f e gt t t tspread p p p      , 
The one-day lag captures the fact that rack prices tend to be set based on the previous-day price in bulk 
markets. 
 Figure 4 plots the spread for the four largest cities in the US along with the negative of the RIN 
revenue. Under full pass-through (β=1), the spread would move one-for-one with the negative RIN 
revenue. With less than perfect pass-through, the spread would change by less than the amount of any 
changes in RIN revenue.  
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All four cities show significant high-frequency (day-to-day) variation as well as shocks that 
persist for several months. Aside from Los Angeles, the spreads are typically less than 10 cents per 
gallon and trend downwards. This downward trend suggests at least partial RIN pass-through, given that 
RIN revenue trended upwards during the same period.  
The Los Angeles spreads were significantly affected by an explosion at the Exxon Mobil refinery 
in Torrance, CA on February 18, 2015. This event, which occurred at a refinery that accounts for 20% of 
Southern California capacity, caused an immediate increase in gasoline spreads and prices in the state, 
especially in Southern California.  Los Angeles prices were as much as $1 per gallon higher than the US 
average in the ensuing months and averaged $0.70 above the US average between the explosion and 
the end of our sample. Based on historical averages and accounting for the California cap and trade 
program, Los Angeles prices should average about $0.40 more than the national average, so this event 
generated a persistent $0.30 premium.5 During this same period, as Figure 4 shows, the rack spread 
averaged about $0.15.  
The refinery restarted in May 2016, which is at the end of our sample. However, it is somewhat 
surprising that sufficient imports did not enter that state to bring the price premiums down before the 
restart. The California Energy Commission’s Petroleum Market Advisory Committee continues to 
investigate this episode in an attempt to understand why prices remained so high for so long.6 In our 
analysis, we account for this event by including a dummy variable in our regressions for the post-
Torrance-explosion observations. We include this dummy separately for San Diego, Los Angeles, and San 
Jose.  This approach may lead us to over-estimate pass-through in these cities. RIN revenue increased 
during this post-Torrance period and there may have been some mean reversion from the Torrance 
event. These concurrent trends would bias our results towards finding pass-through.  
  
                                                          
5 https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2015/09/28/why-are-californias-gasoline-prices-so-high/ 
6 http://www.energy.ca.gov/assessments/petroleum_market/ 
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Figure 4: Rack spreads on E10 in four major cities (cents per gallon) 
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  Table 1 shows average RIN revenue and average spreads for several cuts of the data and for the 
three RIN price periods highlighted in Figure 3. Average RIN revenue was 6.9 cents/gallon higher in the 
RIN shock period than in 2012; it was 5c/gal higher in the high-RIN price period than in 2012. Under full 
pass-through, we expect the change in the spread between periods to be the negative of the change in 
RIN revenue.  
 The entries in Table 1 are simple averages and they have no measures of precision associated 
with them. In the next section, when we present our regression results, we present rigorous estimates 
of pass-through. The objective of this table is to display some descriptive characteristics of the data. The 
decline in spreads is larger for unbranded than for branded fuel, suggesting that the pass-through is 
more complete for unbranded fuel. Average margins in the West are much larger than the other 
regions, as was apparent for Los Angeles in Figure 4.  As we show in the next section, this region also has 
a very high variance, which causes our pass-through estimates to be imprecise.   
 
Table 1: E10 Spread Summary Statistics 
 Full 
Sample 
 Sub-Periods  Pass-Through 
 Low RIN Price 
RIN 
Shock 
High RIN 
Price  
RIN 
Shock 
High RIN 
Price 
 1/12-5/16  1/12-12/12 1/13-8/13 9/13-5/16    
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (3)-(2) (4)-(2) 
         
RIN Revenue (0.1*RIN price) 4.4  0.3 7.1 5.3  6.9 5.0 
         
Branded Spreads         
Scope 1: 10 Large Cities 5.4  6.8 4.2 5.1  -2.6 -1.7 
Scope 2: E85 Cities 0.6  2.6 -0.5 0.2  -3.1 -2.5 
Scope 3: 3 States (IA, IL, MN) 1.4  3.8 1.2 0.5  -2.6 -3.3 
         
West 7.4  8.1 1.7 8.6  -6.4 0.6 
Gulf 2.5  5.2 2.9 1.5  -2.3 -3.7 
Midwest -0.9  1.5 -1.7 -1.5  -3.2 -3.0 
East 2.8  3.9 2.3 2.5  -1.5 -1.4 
         
Unbranded Spreads         
Scope 1: 10 Large Cities 4.7  8.5 4.1 3.5  -4.4 -5.0 
Scope 2: E85 Cities 3.1  5.2 3.7 2.2  -1.5 -3.0 
Scope 3: 3 States (IA, IL, MN) 2.8  5.6 3.7 1.6  -1.9 -4.0 
         
West 7.2  10.9 4.8 6.5  -6.1 -4.3 
Gulf 2.5  5.0 3.8 1.3  -1.2 -3.7 
Midwest 0.9  3.8 1.5 -0.3  -2.3 -4.0 
East 5.2  6.9 5.0 4.6  -1.9 -2.2 
Note:  cents/gallon. The cities in each scope and each region are listed in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. 
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5. E10 RIN Pass-through  
We present several estimates of proportion of RIN revenue that is passed through in E10. First, we 
estimate models of city-average prices that pool data across multiple cities. Next, we present estimated 
pass-through for each city in Scopes 1 and 2 (see Appendix Table A1). Finally, for the four largest cities 
(New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston), we present the estimated pass-through for each rack 
supplier.  
 
5.1. Econometric model 
Our main regression model is  
 0 1 1 1 1...jt j t d t t d t d jtspread R R R R                   ,  (4) 
where j  denotes the city, 1t t tR R R     and recall that R=δρ denotes RIN revenue. This specification 
allows for RIN pass-through not to be instantaneous and possibly take several weeks. Indeed, there is 
evidence in the fuel market for the pass-through of input costs to take several weeks (Borenstein et al., 
1997). The total pass-through of the RIN is measured as β, and the coefficients β j indicate the cumulative 
pass-through after j days. We investigated additional specifications that allowed a seasonality in the 
spreads. These models produced very similar results to those reported in this section, so we proceed 
without including seasonal terms.  
 The regression equation in (4) imposes complete pass-through of the gasoline blendstock and 
ethanol prices. Table 2 shows that the data support this assumption by reporting results from models 
that do not impose it using a pooled sample of 20 large cities. We include one city from each of the 20 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) included in Scopes 1 and 2 (see Appendix Table A1), and weight by 
MSA population. We use 10 lags in the distributed lag specification, but the results are very similar if we 
increase the number of lags to 30. We compute standard errors by clustering at the year-month level. As 
discussed in Section 4, the first half of 2013 was the first time that the markets had experienced RIN 
prices substantially greater than zero. To allow for the possibility that market participants did not adapt 
immediately to this new market reality, we report results both for the full sample and a sample that 
omits the RIN shock period (1/1/13-8/31/13). 
We report in the odd-numbered columns of Table 2 the long-run pass-through estimates from   
 , , ( ) ( ) ( )
f g e g e
jt f t d j t d j t d t jt jt jtp R w w L R L w L w                    ,  (5) 
where , ,0.9
g g
j t d j t dw p   and , ,0.1
e e
j t d j t dw p  .  Alternatively, we report in the even-numbered columns of 
Table 2 results from 
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 , ( ) ( )
f
jt f t d j t d t jt jtp R wc L R L wc             , (6) 
where 0.9 0.1g ejt jt jtwc p p   is the wet fuel cost of E10. The estimated long-run pass-through the wet fuel 
price is not significantly different from one, whether we impose the blend ratio or not. 
 We use population weights as proxies for consumption volumes, which we do not observe. For 
the sample period that drops the RIN shock period, Table 2 shows that pooling the data and weighing 
observations according to the population yields a RIN pass-through between 0.75 and 0.80, regardless of 
whether fuel is branded or not. The pass-through is not precisely estimated as we cannot reject that it is 
not different than 1 or not different than 0.5. These results do not inform about spatial difference in the 
pass-through rate and possible causes for an imperfect pass-through. We look into these questions and 
the robustness of our results in alternative specifications of the regression model. 
 
Table 2: Population-Weighted E10 Pass-through Estimates from Unrestricted Models 
 Full Sample  Drop Jan-Aug 2013 
 Branded  Unbranded   Branded  Unbranded  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Long-Run pass-through         
0.1 RIN (Rt-10) 0.470 0.431 0.431 0.657  0.796 0.783 0.749 0.788 
 (0.108)  (0.108) (0.108)  (0.094)  (0.154) (0.131) (0.154) (0.135) 
          
0.9 BOB , 10( )
g
j tw   0.994  1.012   0.985  1.009  
 (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.006)  (0.008)  
          
0.1 Eth , 10( )
e
j tw   1.097  1.053   1.034  1.000  
 (0.066)   (0.077)   (0.073)  (0.085)  
          
wet fuel cost  1.001  1.014   0.989  1.008 
  (0.004)  (0.005)   (0.006)  (0.006) 
          
Constant 4.653 4.988 2.896 3.310  9.099 8.927 5.025 5.204 
 (1.489) (1.362) (1.438) (1.359)  (2.112) (1.931) (1.753) (1.750) 
Note: Models in (5) and (6) estimated separately for branded and unbranded fuel. Dependent variable is E10 price. 
Metropolitan Statistical Area population from 2010 census used as weights.  Sample includes one city from each of the 20 MSAs 
included in Scopes 1 and 2 (see Appendix Table A1). For the New York MSA, we include Newark and not Long Island or New 
York. For the Miami MSA, we include Miami but not Port Everglades. For each of the California cities, we include a dummy 
variable for the period after the Torrance refinery explosion (2/18/15 through the end of the sample). Standard errors clustered 
by year-month in parentheses. All regressions include 10 distributed lags of each variable. 
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5.2. E10 RIN Pass-through: Pooled Models 
Based on the results in Table 2, we impose full pass-through of the wet fuel cost in subsequent 
regressions. Table 3 presents estimates from the regression in (4) for the same 20 large cities as in Table 
2. In the full sample, we estimate RIN pass-through in these 20 large cities to be 0.46 for branded fuel 
and 0.77 for unbranded fuel. The estimates increase to 0.63 and 0.92 when we drop the RIN shock 
period, which implies that pass-through since September 2013 was better than it was in the first part of 
2013.  Compared to Table 2, the unbranded estimate is slightly higher and the branded estimate is 
slightly lower. 
These estimates have wide confidence intervals. For branded fuel in the sample that excludes 
the RIN shock period, the 95% confidence interval is [0.24, 1.01] and for unbranded fuel it is [0.70, 1.14]. 
These intervals are wide because the RIN subsidy in E10 relatively small; it averages $0.05/gal in the 
high-RIN-price period since September 2013. The small per-gallon magnitude of this subsidy makes it 
impossible to estimate precisely the proportion that is passed through.  
 The pass-through dynamics are estimated quite imprecisely, but the point estimates suggest 
that the long-run pass-through occurs within a week. The last column of Table 3 shows that, for 
unbranded fuel, an estimated 38% of a RIN shock is passed through on the same day. The estimated 
cumulative pass-through increases to 73% the next day and 87% two days later. However, the 
confidence interval on the contemporaneous pass-through is [-0.47, 1.22], followed by [0.03, 1.42] and 
[0.20, 1.54] in the subsequent two days. On branded fuel, the point estimates suggest full pass-through 
on the same days as a RIN price shock, but the standard errors on this estimate are even larger than for 
unbranded fuel. Even though these dynamic estimates are imprecise, they suggest that RIN pass-
through occurs within a week. We continue to include the lag terms in subsequent regressions because 
they absorb the impacts of short-run RIN shocks and thereby enable more precise estimation of the 
long-run pass-through.  
The Torrance dummy variables reveal that the Los Angeles spread was about 16 cents higher for 
branded fuel and 13 cents higher for unbranded fuel during the refinery outage. The San Diego premium 
was lightly smaller at 12 cents and 11 cents, and for San Jose it was 5 cents and -2 cents. If we drop Los 
Angeles and San Diego from the sample, we obtain pass-through estimates of 0.61 for branded fuel and 
0.87 for unbranded fuel in the sample that excludes the RIN shock period. Thus, the inclusion of these 
Southern California cities has little effect on our results.   
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Table 3: Population-Weighted E10 Pass-through 
Full Sample  Drop Jan-Aug 2013 
   Branded  Unbranded   Branded  Unbranded  
Long-Run Pass-through      
Rt-10 0.46 0.77  0.63 0.92 
(0.16) (0.10)  (0.20) (0.11) 
   
Pass-Through Dynamics      
ΔRt 0.40 -0.18  1.07 0.38 
(0.51) (0.23)  (0.70) (0.43) 
   
ΔRt-1 0.57 0.26  1.22 0.73 
(0.45) (0.26)  (0.48) (0.36) 
   
ΔRt-2 0.46 0.20  1.35 0.87 
(0.50) (0.23)  (0.56) (0.34) 
   
ΔRt-3 0.53 0.37  1.27 0.86 
(0.46) (0.22)  (0.55) (0.37) 
   
ΔRt-4 0.38 0.42  1.14 0.73 
(0.46) (0.20)  (0.51) (0.35) 
   
ΔRt-5 0.36 0.50  1.34 1.18 
(0.42) (0.32)  (0.65) (0.36) 
   
ΔRt-6 0.24 0.62  1.00 1.08 
(0.35) (0.18)  (0.53) (0.31) 
   
ΔRt-7 0.05 0.32  0.84 0.78 
(0.43) (0.20)  (0.58) (0.35) 
   
ΔRt-8 0.07 0.20  0.71 0.74 
(0.47) (0.24)  (0.51) (0.30) 
   
ΔRt-9 0.22 0.37  0.62 0.90 
(0.51) (0.29)  (0.73) (0.34) 
   
Torrance Dummy (LA) 15.72 13.23  15.93 13.56 
(1.99) (2.22)  (2.05) (2.29) 
   
Torrance Dummy (SD) 11.84 10.65  12.32 11.25 
(2.05) (2.68)  (2.09) (2.75) 
   
Torrance Dummy (SJ) 4.82 -1.78  4.99 -1.60 
(1.34) (1.16)  (1.49) (1.37) 
   
Constant 5.69 7.29  6.29 7.65 
(0.95) (0.50)  (1.04) (0.55) 
  
Observations 25,081 25,078  21,217 21,214 
Note: Metropolitan Statistical Area population from 2010 census used as weights.  Sample includes one city 
from each of the 20 MSAs included in Scopes 1 and 2 (see Appendix Table A1). For the New York MSA, we 
include Newark and not Long Island or New York. For the Miami MSA, we include Miami but not Port 
Everglades. For each of the California cities, we include a dummy variable for the period after the Torrance 
refinery explosion (2/18/15 through the end of the sample). Standard errors clustered by year-month in 
parentheses. 
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One potential concern with the regression equation in (4) is that coincident trends could confound the 
pas through of the RIN price. If the spread would have trended downwards regardless of what happened 
to RNI prices, then the regression in (4) would attribute that trend to RINs. A robust way to account for 
omitted trends is to estimate the model in first differences, i.e., to estimate 
 2 2 20 1 1 1 1...ft f t d t t d t d ftspread R R R R                     ,  (5) 
We report results from this specification in Appendix Table A3. The estimate pass-through coefficients 
are smaller than those in Table 3, but they are estimated very imprecisely. The 95% confidence interval 
for branded fuel is [-1.06, 1.22] and the interval for unbranded fuel is [-0.54, 1.18] in the sample that 
excludes the RIN shock period. These intervals include both zero and complete pass-through, so they 
provide little information. We have no reason to believe that spreads would have trended downwards in 
the absence of the RIN trend, so we report results from levels regressions like (4) in the remainder of the 
paper.  
Figure 4 presents estimates of the parameter β for three different cuts of the data. Each 
diamond in the figure is an estimate of β a different regression and the vertical bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. Column 1 of Figure 4 shows results for the full sample and column 2 shows results 
for the sample that drops the RIN shock period. We highlight five results from these regressions. In the 
remainder of the paper, we focus on results that exclude the RIN shock period.  
 First, dropping the RIN shock period from the sample increases the pass-through estimate in all 
but one case. The single exception is the East region, which we discuss further below.  Second, in every 
case, the pass-through to unbranded fuel prices is higher than the pass-through to branded prices. This 
finding may reflect stronger competition in the unbranded market. A retail station purchasing 
unbranded fuel will shop for the lowest price, whereas a branded retail station has little choice about 
where to buy fuel.  
Third, average pass-through in the three states (MN, IA, IL) is close to complete for both 
branded and unbranded fuel. The point estimates are 0.90 for branded fuel and 1.02 for unbranded. 
These three states also tend to have the penetration of high-ethanol-blend fuels. For the cities in the 
E85 scope, estimated pass-through is somewhat lower, at 0.54 for branded and 0.76 for unbranded fuel. 
The estimated pass though in the 10 Cities scope is slightly higher than for the E85 Cities scope. 
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Figure 4: Long-Run E10 Pass-Through to E10 Rack-City Prices – Pooled Models 
Note: Regressions contain city fixed effects and 10 lags. For each of the California cities, we include a dummy 
variable for the period after the Torrance refinery explosion (2/18/15 through the end of the sample). Standard 
errors clustered by year-month. The first column results use all data in the interval 1/1/12-5/31/16, whereas the 
second column results include 1/1/12-12/31/12 and 9/1/13-5/31/16. The cities in each scope, region, and ethanol 
availability category are shown in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. 
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Fourth, pass-through is close to one in the Gulf and Midwest regions, incomplete in the East, 
and highly uncertain in the West. Using the sample that drops the RIN shock period, the estimated pass-
through coefficients in these two regions are 0.88 and 0.86 for branded fuel and 0.89 and 0.99 for 
unbranded fuel. Estimated pass-through in the East is significantly less than one, at 0.38 and 0.50 for 
branded and unbranded fuel, respectively. The West estimates are very imprecise, due in large part to 
the highly variable margins in many Western markets. The branded pass-through estimate is 0.57, but 
the 95% confidence interval ranges from -0.49 to 1.63. For unbranded fuel in the West, the confidence 
interval ranges from 0.58 to 2.06.  
Fifth, in cities with more than five suppliers offering high-blend-ethanol fuel, the pass-through is 
close to complete. As shown in Figure 2, these cities are in the middle of the country and close to where 
ethanol is produced. For cities with fewer firms offering ethanol products, estimated pass-through is 
about 0.5 for branded fuel. The pattern is less clear for unbranded fuel, where estimated pass-through is 
less than complete for cities with 1-2 ethanol suppliers (0.54), but complete for cities with no high-blend 
–ethanol suppliers. 
 
5.3. E10 RIN Pass-through – City Models 
The top row Figure 5 shows pass-through estimates for each of the large cities in Scope 1, and the 
bottom row shows estimates for each of the E85 cities in Scope 2. The results reinforce the findings 
displayed in Figure 4.  
Estimated pass-through is close to complete in the three Midwest cities. Minneapolis produces 
the smallest estimated pass-through, but it is estimated much less precisely than the Des Moines and 
Chicago parameters.  In the Gulf region, the estimates for Austin, Oklahoma City and Wichita all have 
estimated pass-through coefficients close to one. The Houston estimate is statistically less than one for 
both branded and unbranded fuel, as is Dallas for branded fuel. Notably, Oklahoma City and Wichita, 
which exhibit full pass-through, also had more suppliers of high-ethanol-blends than the Texas cities. 
These two cities had more than five suppliers of high-ethanol-blends at the rack, whereas Austin and 
Houston had three and Dallas had two.  
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Figure 5: Long-Run E10 Pass-Through to E10 Rack-City Prices – City Models 
Note: The first row includes the cities in Scope 1 and the second row includes the cities in Scope 2 (see Appendix Table A1). 
Regressions contain 10 lags. Standard errors estimated using Newey-West with 30 lags. Sample period: 1/1/12-12/31/12 and 
9/1/13-5/31/16. For each of the California cities, we include a dummy variable for the period after the Torrance refinery 
explosion (2/18/15 through the end of the sample). 
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The Eastern cities exhibit strong differences by branding and geography. For unbranded fuel in 
Philadelphia and the New York area, estimated pass-through is complete. However, estimated pass-
through in branded fuel prices is less than 0.6 in each of these cities and the confidence interval does 
not include one. In Atlanta and the Florida cities, estimated pass-through is less than 0.5 in all cases. The 
results from these southeastern cities are less precise than their northeastern counterparts. This likely 
reflects the fact that Florida is no connected to the rest of the country by pipeline. Most gasoline 
consumed in Florida travels by ship from Gulf Coast refineries. Atlanta lies along the Colonial pipeline, 
which is the major carrier of gasoline from the Gulf Coast to the Northeast. However, for almost all of 
the sample, Atlanta required low-sulfur gasoline, which is a distinct product not consumed anywhere 
else. The idiosyncratic nature of this product likely contributes to the high volatility in Atlanta spreads. 
 Consistent with the pooled results in Figure 4, the western cities produce results with very wide 
confidence intervals. El Paso and Denver exhibit the widest confidence intervals. These two cities are 
somewhat isolated and have a local refinery that supplies a substantial proportion of the local supply. 
This feature means that the bulk gasoline spot prices we use in these markets may not always accurately 
reflect the marginal cost to blenders of acquiring gasoline blendstock. As a result, our estimated spreads 
are highly volatile and the estimated pass-through coefficients are imprecise. The Phoenix estimate is 
almost as imprecise as those for El Paso and Denver. Similar to the Atlanta region, the Phoenix area 
requires an idiosyncratic gasoline product to meet air-quality objectives, which appears to generate 
volatile spreads.7 
 On the West Coast, we find full pass-through for Portland for both branded and unbranded 
fuels. The estimates for the California cities are more precise than El Paso, Denver, and Phoenix, but still 
much less precise than those from the Gulf or Midwest regions. For branded fuel, the 95% confidence 
interval includes one in each of the three cities. For unbranded fuel the estimated pass-through 
coefficients exceed one. The Los Angeles and San Diego estimates become negative if we omit the 
Torrance-explosion dummy variable. This result arises because the Torrance explosion occurred at the 
end of the sample when RIN prices were high. However, it is clear that spreads were high because of the 
explosion and not because of RIN prices, so it is important to control for the explosion, as we do. 
 
                                                          
7 For both Atlanta and Phoenix, we use gasoline blendstock prices that are specific to those markets (see Table A1), 
so this volatility is not caused by using a generic blendstock price to compute the spread. 
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5.4. E10 RIN Pass-through – Suppliers Within Cities 
Figure 6 reports estimates by supplier for the four largest cities in the US: Loa Angeles, Houston, 
Chicago, and Newark. We estimate a separate regression for each supplier at each terminal that posted 
prices on at least 800 out of the 909 days in the sample period. There are multiple terminals in each city 
and some suppliers post prices at multiple terminals. Such suppliers enter Figure 6 for each terminal at 
which they post. To preserve firm anonymity, we randomly order the suppliers designate them by 
number.  
  
 
Figure 6: Long-Run E10 Pass-Through to E10 Supplier Prices  
Note: Separate regression for each supplier at each terminal that had at least 800 daily observations (maximum number of 
observations is 909). Suppliers are ordered randomly to preserve anonymity. Regressions contain 10 lags. Standard errors 
estimated using Newey-West with 30 lags. Sample period: 1/1/12-12/31/12 and 9/1/13-5/31/16. For Los Angeles, we include a 
dummy variable for the period after the Torrance refinery explosion (2/18/15 through the end of the sample). 
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The pass-through coefficients on branded fuel are very similar within each city, especially for Chicago 
and Houston, which are the two with the highest average pass-through. This finding reflects the very 
similar, and often identical, prices that are posted for branded fuel across suppliers. It suggests that 
branded suppliers pay close attention to each other when posting prices. Los Angeles is an exception to 
this observation – the branded prices in Los Angeles show quite variable pass-through, although the 
confidence intervals are very wide. 
Table 3 and Figure 4 showed that the average pass-through in unbranded fuel is higher than in 
branded. Figure 6 shows that unbranded pass-through is also much more variable than its branded 
counterpart. It is possible that the posted prices overstate the variation in prices paid because low 
volumes may transact at some of these prices.  
 
5.5. E10 RIN Pass-through – Terminal Competition   
In this section, we investigate two hypotheses that could explain differences in E10 pass-through across 
cities. First, we investigate whether the pass-through is higher in cities with more retail stations offering 
E85. Second, we whether pass-through is better in cities with more open terminals. 
Figure 4 shows that cities with multiple parties posting high-blend-ethanol prices tend to have 
better pass-through than cities with fewer high-blend-ethanol suppliers. An alternative measure of high-
ethanol-blend activity is the number of stations close to the terminal that offer E85.  More E85 activity 
may elp promote competition in ethanol sales and lead to more RIN pass-through. However, Table 4 
shows that pass-through is not significantly different in cities with more E85 stations.  
 We do not have a direct measure of the openness of terminals in a city. Because closed 
terminals tend to have only one supplier, we use as a proxy for openness the average number of 
suppliers per terminal. If a city has a high average number of suppliers per terminal then it suggests that 
multiple suppliers post prices at each terminal, which is a sign of openness. When computing this 
statistic, we do not account for corporate relationships among the suppliers because for most suppliers 
we do not know these relationships.8 Thus, this measure of openness is imprecise. Table 4 shows no 
significant increase in pass though for locations with a high number of suppliers per terminal. We 
conclude that pass-through is high through the three Midwestern states, and we see no evidence that it 
variaes according to these measures of competition.  
                                                          
8 For example, if Chevron and Texaco are listed as suppliers at a terminal, we would count that as two suppliers 
even though in the case of these two companies we know that they are the same organization.   
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Table 4: E10 Pass-through in Midwestern States 
 Br. Unbr.  Br. Unbr.  Br. Unbr. 
Long-Run RIN pass-through         
Rt-10 0.92 0.99  0.90 0.99  0.84 1.06 
 (0.12) (0.11)  (0.11) (0.10)  (0.13) (0.14) 
         
Interactions         
(High E85 Stations within 25 mi)*Rt-10 -0.03 0.08       
 (0.05) (0.06)       
         
(High E85 stations within 75 mi)*Rt-10    0.01 0.08    
    (0.04) (0.06)    
         
(High ratio of suppliers to terminals)*Rt-10       0.13 -0.08 
       (0.11) (0.13) 
         
Constant 4.95 6.74  4.95 6.74  4.95 6.75 
 (0.54) (0.47)  (0.54) (0.47)  (0.54) (0.47) 
         
Observations 36,166 34,918  36,166 34,918  36,166 34,918 
Number of Cities 39 38  39 38  39 38 
Note: Sample is cities in Scope 3 (see Appendix Table A1). For the interactions terms “high” is defined as above the median. The 
ratio of suppliers to terminals equals the total number of supplier-terminal combinations in a city divided by the total number 
of terminals. When computing the supplier/terminal totals, we weight by the number of days that each supplier/terminal post 
prices. Regressions include city fixed effects and 10 distributed lags. Standard errors clustered by year-month in parentheses. 
Br. denotes branded and Unbr. denotes unbranded. 
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5.6. High-Ethanol-Blend RIN Pass-through   
As shown in Figure 2, suppliers post prices for high-ethanol fuel blends in numerous cities. These 
products range from E60 to E85 in increments of five. The most offered products are E70 and E75. 
Figure 7 plots the rack spread for branded and unbranded E70 in Minneapolis, computed as in (1) with 
δ=0.7. The figure shows strong pass-through for branded fuel in the last two years of the sample, but 
little evidence of any pass-through during the RIN shock period in 2013. In contrast, the unbranded 
product shows much less correlation between the spread and RIN revenue.  
 Visual inspections of the data revealed substantial heterogeneity across suppliers in each 
market. This heterogeneity means that city average prices often obscure the pass-through for individual 
suppliers. For this reason, we report in Figure 8 the estimated pass-through results for each supplier in 
each market. In most markets, some suppliers fully pass-through the RIN and some do not. Lade and 
Bushnell (2016) find complete pass-through of the RIN to E85 prices in Midwestern cities. Li and Stock 
(2017) find a similar result for Minneapolis. Thus, we expect that most retailer are purchasing from the 
suppliers that pass-through the RIN.  
 
 
 
    
 Figure 7: Rack spreads on E70 in Minneapolis (cents per gallon) 
Note: The left figure is for branded fuel and the second figure is for unbranded.  The red line is -0.7 times the RIN price.  
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Figure 8:  Long-Run E65-E85 Pass-Through by Supplier 
Note: Separate regression for each supplier at each terminal for each fuel grade that had at least 400 daily observations 
(maximum number of observations is 909). Suppliers are numbered in cities with fewer than four suppliers to preserve 
anonymity. Regressions contain 10 lags. Standard errors estimated using Newey-West with 30 lags. Sample period: 1/1/12-
12/31/12 and 9/1/13-5/31/16. We include cities in Scope 2 (see Appendix Table A1).  
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6. Conclusion 
We estimate the RIN prices are fully passed through the E10 rack prices in the Midwest and the Gulf. We 
find less than perfect pass-through in the East and imprecise results in the West due to the noise in the 
data. Overall, average pass-through across 20 large cities (population-weighted) is 0.63 for branded fuel 
and 0.92 for unbranded fuel.  Those national estimates are imprecise, and are consistent with low pass-
through rates and with full pass-through. When we look at pass-through regionally, however, we find 
significant differences across regions, with essentially complete pass-through at the rack in the Gulf and 
Midwest, and less than complete pass-through in the East. High pass-though also aligns with the 
availability of higher blends at the rack. 
Our finding of incomplete pass-through at the rack is informative about the current RIN system. 
In particular, these findings indicate that, at many terminals, fuel suppliers are exercising market power 
and retaining some of the RIN premium. As a result, the RIN value is not being fully passed through to 
consumers, at least at some racks in some locations, such as the East Coast. The point of obligation is 
irrelevant when there is complete pass-through. By themselves, however, these findings are not 
sufficient to conclude that shifting the point of obligation from refiners and importers downstream to 
the owner of the fuel just above the rack would improve pass-through and economic efficiency. There 
are other potential causes of incomplete pass-through that are independent of the RIN system, and 
identifying those causes goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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 Table A1: Cities in Dataset by Scope 
Rack City St. E10 Product BOB Product 
BOB 
Source 
BOB Spot  
Market 
Ethanol Spot 
Market 
Scope 1: 10 Large Cities     
Austin TX CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular SRI Gulf Coast Gulf Coast 
Chicago IL RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI Chicago Chicago 
Dallas TX RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI Gulf Coast Gulf Coast 
Houston TX RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI Gulf Coast Gulf Coast 
Los Angeles CA CARFG Ethanol 10% CARBOB Regular Unleaded SRI Los Angeles Los Angeles 
New York NY RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI NY Harbor Barge NY Harbor Barge 
Newark NJ RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI NY Harbor Barge NY Harbor Barge 
Philadelphia PA RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI NY Harbor Barge NY Harbor Barge 
Phoenix AZ CBG Ethanol 10% AZ RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI Los Angeles Los Angeles 
San Diego CA CARFG Ethanol 10% CARBOB Regular Unleaded SRI Los Angeles Los Angeles 
San Jose CA CARFG Ethanol 10% CARBOB Regular Unleaded SRI San Francisco Los Angeles 
       
Scope 2: E85 Cities 
    
Atlanta GA CBOB Ethanol 10% LS CBOB Unl Spot Gulf Coast Chicago 
Denver CO Conv. Ethanol 10%/ CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular Spot Group 3 Chicago 
Des Moines IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/ CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
El Paso TX CBOB Ethanol 10% CBOB Unl SRI Gulf Coast Chicago 
Long Island NY RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular SRI NY Harbor Barge NY Harbor Barge 
Miami FL CBOB Ethanol 10% CBOB Unl SRI 
Gulf Coast 
Waterborne Tampa Barge 
Minneapolis MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/ CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Oklahoma City OK Conv. Ethanol 10%/ CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Portland OR Conv. Ethanol 10%/ CBOB Ethanol 10% Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Pacific Northwest Pacific Northwest 
Pt. Everglades FL CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular Spot 
Gulf Coast 
Waterborne Tampa Barge 
Tampa FL CBOB Ethanol 10% CBOB Unl SRI 
Gulf Coast 
Waterborne Tampa Barge 
Wichita KS Conv. Ethanol 10%/ CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Note:  Dallas enters the dataset as 3 separate cities “Dallas Metro”, “Dallas/Grapevine”, and “Dallas/Southlake”. Houston and Dallas are also in the E85 Cities dataset. Chicago, Des Moines and 
Minneapolis are also in the 3 States dataset. In fall 2013, the default E10 product switched from “Conv. Ethanol 10%” to “CBOB Ethanol 10%” in many cities. The corresponding BOB product 
switched from “Unleaded Regular” to “Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular” at the same time.  
 Table A1: Cities in Dataset by Scope (continued) 
Rack City St. E10 Product BOB Product BOB Source 
BOB spot 
market 
Ethanol Spot 
Market 
Scope 3: 3 States     
Bettendorf IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Council Bluffs IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Dubuque IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Ft. Madison IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% CBOB Unl Spot Chicago Chicago 
Iowa City IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Lemars IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Mason Cty IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Milford IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Sioux City IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Waterloo IA Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Argo IL RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular Spot Chicago Chicago 
Champaign IL CBOB Ethanol 10% CBOB Unl Spot Chicago Chicago 
Decatur IL Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Des Plaines IL RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular Spot Chicago Chicago 
Heyworth IL CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Kankakee IL Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Lemont IL RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular Spot Chicago Chicago 
Lockport IL RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular Spot Chicago Chicago 
Mt. Prospect IL RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular Spot Chicago Chicago 
Norris City IL Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular Spot Group 3 Chicago 
Robinson IL Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% CBOB Unl Spot Chicago Chicago 
Rockford IL CBOB Ethanol 10% CBOB Unl Spot Chicago Chicago 
Wood River IL RFG Ethanol 10% RBOB Unleaded Regular Spot Group 3 Chicago 
Note:  Mason City enters the dataset as “Mason Cty/Clr.Lk.”. We dropped Ottumwa, IA, Ft. Dodge, IA and Foresview, IL due to incomplete data. Decatur enters the dataset as 
“Decatur/Forsythe”. In fall 2013, the default E10 product switched from “Conv. Ethanol 10%” to “CBOB Ethanol 10%” in many cities. The corresponding BOB product switched from “Unleaded 
Regular” to “Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular” at the same time. 
  
 Table A1: Cities in Dataset by Scope (continued) 
Rack City St. E10 Product BOB Product BOB Source 
BOB Spot 
Market 
Ethanol Spot 
Market 
Scope 3: 3 States (continued)     
Alexandria MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Duluth MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Mankato MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Marshall MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Moorhead MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Rochester MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Rosemount MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Roseville MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular Spot Group 3 Chicago 
Sauk Centre MN Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Omaha NE Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Sioux Falls SD Conv. Ethanol 10%/CBOB Ethanol 10% Unleaded Regular/ Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular SRI Group 3 Chicago 
Note:  Rosemount enters the dataset as “Pn Bnd/FlntHlsRs”. Roseville enters the dataset as two separate cities “Rsvile/FlntHlsRs” and  “Roseville/Magellan”. Duluth enters the dataset as three 
separate cities “Duluth”, “Duluth/Esko” and “Duluth/Wrenshall”. In fall 2013, the default E10 product switched from “Conv. Ethanol 10%” to “CBOB Ethanol 10%” in many cities. The 
corresponding BOB product switched from “Unleaded Regular” to “Sub-Octane Unleaded Regular” at the same time.
 Table A2: Cities in Dataset by Geography and High-Ethanol-Blend Offerings 
Region  
West Portland, San Jose, Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, El Paso, Denver 
Gulf Austin, Houston, Dallas, Oklahoma City, Wichita 
Midwest Omaha, Des Moines, Minneapolis, Chicago 
East New York, Newark, Long Island, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Tampa, 
Miami, Pt. Everglades 
  
Number of Suppliers of High-Blend-Ethanol 
>5 Suppliers Oklahoma City, Wichita, Omaha, Des Moines, Minneapolis 
3-5 Suppliers Phoenix, El Paso, Austin, Dallas, Chicago, Atlanta 
1-2 Suppliers Portland, Denver, Houston, Wood River, Long Island, Tampa, 
Miami, Pt. Everglades 
0 Suppliers San Jose, Los Angeles, San Diego, Philadelphia, Newark, New York 
 
  
 Table A3: Population-Weighted E10 Pass-through First Difference Models 
Full Sample  Drop Jan-Aug 2013 
   Branded  Unbranded   Branded  Unbranded  
Long-Run Pass-through      
Rt-10 0.09 0.51  0.08 0.32 
(0.53) (0.23)  (0.58) (0.44) 
   
Pass-Through Dynamics      
ΔRt 0.21 -0.14  0.32 -0.25 
(0.15) (0.14)  (0.30) (0.32) 
   
ΔRt-1 0.45 0.32  0.64 0.30 
(0.24) (0.19)  (0.39) (0.33) 
   
ΔRt-2 0.34 0.26  0.76 0.41 
(0.27) (0.17)  (0.57) (0.26) 
   
ΔRt-3 0.41 0.43  0.70 0.40 
(0.25) (0.16)  (0.53) (0.30) 
   
ΔRt-4 0.24 0.47  0.65 0.29 
(0.27) (0.13)  (0.60) (0.33) 
   
ΔRt-5 0.22 0.54  0.81 0.73 
(0.43) (0.28)  (0.81) (0.37) 
   
ΔRt-6 0.10 0.67  0.47 0.62 
(0.58) (0.20)  (0.73) (0.36) 
   
ΔRt-7 -0.11 0.35  0.37 0.34 
(0.49) (0.20)  (0.76) (0.38) 
   
ΔRt-8 -0.09 0.22  0.21 0.27 
(0.49) (0.23)  (0.61) (0.40) 
   
ΔRt-9 0.17 0.53  0.33 0.60 
(0.50) (0.23)  (0.72) (0.44) 
   
Torrance Dummy (LA) 0.06 -0.01  0.07 -0.01 
(0.20) (0.19)  (0.20) (0.19) 
   
Torrance Dummy (SD) 0.06 -0.05  0.07 -0.06 
(0.20) (0.20)  (0.19) (0.20) 
   
Torrance Dummy (SJ) 0.05 -0.01  0.05 -0.01 
(0.15) (0.10)  (0.15) (0.12) 
   
Constant 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.01 
(0.04) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) 
  
Observations 25,061 25,058  21,197 21,194 
Note: Metropolitan Statistical Area population from 2010 census used as weights.  Sample includes one city 
from each of the 20 MSAs included in Scopes 1 and 2 (see Appendix Table A1). For the New York MSA, we 
include Newark and not Long Island or New York. For the Miami MSA, we include Miami but not Port 
Everglades. For each of the California cities, we include a dummy variable for the period after the Torrance 
refinery explosion (2/18/15 through the end of the sample). Standard errors clustered by year-month in 
parentheses. 
